Democracy and Citizenship: expanding domains

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Contemporary political theory includes lively debates about the meaning and scope of both democracy and citizenship. Some take a pessimistic view, arguing in particular that both democracy and citizenship are 'hollowing out', maintaining for example that citizenship roles and practices have become enfolded within those of the 'consumer' (Clarke), as part of the expansion of market thinking in politics. Relatedly, others maintain that we live in a time of 'audience democracy' (Manin 1997), or 'spectatorial democracy' (Zolo), in which citizens are passive and pacified observers of a political game which enfolds them symbolically if at all. In this context, we could say that 'expanding domains' include the expansion of economic conceptions of marketised, passive consumption into the realm of democratic citizenship.

But for much of normative political theory the idea of expanding domains has a progressive ring too; theorists seek to address this perceived 'hollowing out', thinning or weakening of both democracy and citizenship. Theorists who write about democracy and citizenship are, by and large, strong democrats; in varied and contested ways, they seek democratic extension and reinvigoration. Real advances in citizenship practice flow from real political struggles, of course. But struggle and progressive theory go hand in hand. In this chapter, first, I will explore key ways in which elements of contemporary innovative conceptions of democracy – deliberative, 'difference', cosmopolitan, ecological and others - seek to reconstruct and reconstrue citizens and citizenship (and often disagree with each other in the process, within and across these categories of innovation). I shall do this by pinpointing some key ways in which these innovations seek to expand the domains of democratic citizenship by reconfiguring (1) where we find citizens, (2) how they are construed, and (3) what expectations are held of them. Secondly, I try to respond to the challenges posed by innovative theories, by showing how the core notions of political representation and democracy itself need to be reconfigured in order to enable us to apply them meaningfully, and to continue the recommendatory tasks of political theory, in an era of scepticism, rapid political change and social complexity.

One approach I do *not* adopt here is to describe 'master discourses' of Liberal and Republican (and perhaps as well Communitarian and Radical) approaches to democracy and citizenship. Broadly Liberal conceptions stress the individual and his or her rights and interests. Broadly Republican conceptions stress self-government, the public interest and citizen striving to realise both. We could construct relatively artificial ideal-types of both and use them to frame our discussion. However, it is more helpful to go down a level of detail and nuance from the start, rather than to seek too much reduction to overarching categories; to look at specific contemporary democratic innovations which nonetheless draw, in distinctive and partial ways, on

liberal, republican and other broader conceptions (deliberative models of democracy, for instance, draw upon threads in republican thinking).

One should start with definitions, of course. At one important level, 'democracy' and 'citizenship' are signifiers (or – can be and are used as signifiers) standing for a variety of practices, institutions and ideas. In that sense, these concepts to not mean one thing, but can mean a range of things. At the same time, they can't mean just *anything*. Citizenship is about membership of or inclusion in a political community, and the rights, obligations and expectations which follow from membership. It can be seen as a (formal or informal) statuses and identities, along with a set of (formal and informal) practices or actions. Democracy's defining principles are popular rule and political equality (Beetham 1999), however exactly those concepts are interpreted. These democratic principles can be crystallised into definitions that stress further principles (e.g. majoritarianism), or institutional structures (e.g. parliamentarism) or attributes (e.g. active political participation).

My frame, then, will be the idea of 'expanding domains' (though expansions on one front may involve contractions on another). New conceptions of democracy challenge much received wisdom, including by seeking to extend our ideas of citizenship. New conceptions of democracy stretch the idea of democratic citizenship in kind, breadth and depth. Specifically, I shall ask of the innovative approaches to democracy:

1. Where does democracy find or see its citizens?

It is common, when discussing citizenship, to ask about its 'extent', who is included and who excluded[1]. My first question encompasses a concern with extent but seeks to go beyond it. Theorists and others find or locate citizens within states or other territorial communities – broader 'arenas' if you like. But they also find or see citizens acting out their citizenship in specific other sorts of locale too, physical locations or functional ones. Some actions in some places are understood as citizen actions, even defining of citizenly action; differences about what those places and actions are take us to the hart of key debates around democracy and citizenship today.

2. How does it construct or construe them?

Discussions of both democracy and citizenship regularly take as unproblematic the identities of constituents and citizens. However, a key thread in recent theory has been the unstable and uncertain process of construction of identities and subject roles in both democracy and citizenship. Citizens are made not born, and how they are made, what casts are used to mould them in obvious and non-obvious ways, ought not to be overlooked. Hence the construction and construal of citizens, the forging of (and the failure to forge?) citizen identities appropriate to different conceptions of democracy.

3. What does it expect or demand of them?

Expectations on democratic citizens depend on how those citizens are understood, in terms of their inclinations, identities and capacities or competences. Often

[1] See Isin and Turner (2002). Their account of the 'three fundamental axes of citizenship' – extent, content, and depth – overlaps in various ways with my three questions.

expectations, or at least hopes, centre around mutual recognition and respect around certain civil, political and social rights, and the obligations to act in certain ways that come with those rights and their protection. Democratic innovations seek to extend the domains of expectorations in some revived, and some imaginatively new, directions, as we shall see.

In the paper's first section I shall ask these three questions of a range of interventions in the form of several popular but partial conceptions of democracy – liberal representative, deliberative, difference, cosmopolitan, ecological, direct and associative. Sometimes these views of citizenship flow explicitly from work within these democratic innovations. I will not cover a set number of innovations under each question, and nor do I wish to suggest that these form coherent, complete bodies of thought (far from it, contestation is great within as well as across these innovations). At other times, I consider what these innovations might most plausibly say, given other things they say.

Democratic innovations and citizenship

1. Where does democracy find its citizens?

Growing haphazardly and with multiple variations out of the American and French revolutions, democracy came to be practiced in (and only practic*able*) a territorial entity with definite borders wrapped around a people who constituted a nation. The primary democratic mechanism was formal political representation based on elections, in the context of liberal constitutionalism and the rule of law. Democracy, in this conception, found (and finds) its citizens inside those legal and physical borders. Citizens are nationals, members of that nation.

A common, 'thin' conception of citizenship might stop the discussion right there. Formal inclusion within, or expulsion from, the nation-state defines where citizens are to be 'found', and further differentiation is undesirable and unnecessary. According to this view, you are equally a citizen whatever your religion, cultural and ethnic background, 'race', class and so on; these particularities of your identity do not impinge on your citizenship status, which is universal for members.

Citizenship as basic membership of the nation-state carries rights to freedom, redress, and political participation. These rights have often been won through bloody struggle by the excluded – working men, then women – in many countries. The precise way in which these are understood from one democratic country to another, of course. Nonetheless, contemporary democratic systems are largely liberal democratic ones, where liberal conceptions of rights and freedoms underpin a broader notion of individuals pursuing, largely and rightfully unimpeded, their interests or happiness. Within this universalist liberal conception, there are more specific spaces in which citizens are to be found – or more accurately where citizenly actions are to be seen. Arguably, the key one is the polling booth – citizens as people in paradigmatic moments exercising their rights to pursue their interests by making choices about their rulers in privacy. The supposedly neutral 'individual' and 'citizen' in this conception is modelled on the idealised vision of the white male in western societies and how he

has been understood – independent, cultured, possessed of clear interests and inclined to pursue them (Pateman 1987).

Liberal and liberal democratic traditions are not uniform. Nonetheless, they largely buy into this universalist approach to citizenship with few additional 'places' to find or see citizenly acts other than the polling booth (workplaces, the home, and even the streets – apart from a measured amount of peaceful and lawful protest – are by and large not seen as 'political' spaces, or at least it is not desirable that they be treated as such by citizens). But this conception is challenged. In a nutshell: various innovative new democratic approaches press us to ask whether we should recognised citizen actions as valid and even desirable in varied other spaces too: in private as well as in public spaces and activities; outside the borders as well as in them; in the intensity of activity rather than specified activities; or even beyond the boundaries of the category of 'people'.

Deliberative democrats, for example, wish to add another layer of where citizens are found – namely in *forums*. According to the deliberative idea citizens come together in forums to do those things that are most citizenly, and which are most intensely connected to the heart of democracy – talk, dialogue, reasoning together, becoming informed together and making decisions that reflect more than narrow self-interest and non-deliberative preferences (Bohman and Rehg 1997; Fishkin 1997; Dryzek 2000). The forum is a place-metaphor for clubs, parties, homes, associations, workplaces, special media locations and events, in public demonstrations, and so on, each and all of which expand the domains in which citizens are founded, and citizen actions (it is hoped, by advocates) occur. The contrast with the polling-booth-and-little-more liberal conception is drawn (a little too) starkly, but nevertheless the point is clear and accurate enough. A good deal of deliberative thinking is influenced by strands of republican thinking about citizenship and public life (Pettit). Deliberative forums can be of different kinds – from familiar liberal democratic ones like parliaments to unfamiliar ones with democratic potential such as spontaneous local citizen groups and specially designed randomly-selected groups. When and where people deliberate, ideally they exhibit citizenly virtues of participation, tolerance, recognition of others, and so on. The paradigmatic liberal democratic activity of voting does not carry the promise of such virtue-fostering capacity.

'Deliberative democracy' covers a multitude of variants, however. In terms of where citizens are found or seen, consider in particular the quite restricted overall picture that emerges from a broad survey of the the range of forums noted in the deliberative democracy literature:

Table 1: A typology of deliberative forums

Deliberative forum	*Formal*	*Informal*
Representative	A Parliament and linked institutions such as Select Committees; deliberative opinion polls linked to referendums or initiatives?	B Deliberative opinion polls which are not state-sponsored; citizens' juries; some 'focus groups'
Non-representative	C Supreme or High courts with constitution-interpreting functions; cabinets in appointive systems (e.g. US)	D Associations (state-sponsored or otherwise); political parties (state-funded or otherwise, especially in multi-party systems); 'protected enclaves'; 'subaltern counterpublics'; 'discursive designs'

From table 1, we can see that most deliberative forums do not involve citizens directly; and that the ones that *do* generally lack decisional power and broader democratic legitimacy. We might hope that our elected politicians, and judges, will be good citizens. But across the range of forums considered in table 1, it is the informal spaces and groups, which can embrace the widest array of citizens and citizenly action. Yet these are relatively marginal in our political systems – not part of conventional representative structures, and therefore lacking on conventional democratic legitimacy, as well as being detached from formal decisional processes. In sum, deliberationists extend the domains of where we might find or see citizens and citizenly acts, but the picture they offer us is highly varied and the extent of its departure from liberal limitations should not be exaggerated.

So-called difference democrats have offered critiques of the limited range of forums concerned. Certainly difference democrats like Iris Young have been keen to promote societies as a single forum or a series of forums in which subordinated voices can speak of their aspirations and experiences alongside dominant groups – and with it a notion of citizenship which emphasises radical dialogical engagement and inclusion. We might say that one thread of deliberative thinking in recent democratic theory has been Rawlsian – a limited range of more or less circumscribed forums whose goal is achieving commonality of citizen action and outlook (Rawls 1997)[2]- and another has been radical, stressing the importance of less circumscribed or controlled sites of deliberation and contestation (and these as paradigmatic spaces, or potential spaces, for the enactment of citizenship)[3]. Difference democrats do not only stress the public

[2] There is much scope to question whether Rawls's later writings add up to a conception of democracy that is deliberative in any substantial sense. See discussions in Dryzek (2000) and Saward (2002).
[3] An elaboration of the circumscribed/uncircumscribed distinction can be found in Saward (2001).

sphere as vital to citizen action; they stress in particular the irreducibly plural character of that sphere, a and of the deliberation that may occur between and across different groups with different perspectives (Young 2000). Other influential threads stress the importance of conventional representative legislatures achieving a level of descriptive representation, in line with a 'politics of presence' which is not unduly subsumed under a 'politics of ideas' (Phillips 1995). From the earlier roots of difference-based critiques in feminist theory, we can pick up further extensions of the sites or domains of democratic citizenship – for example, according to some feminist critics citizens can be found in the home and the local neighbourhood, and in the school and the supermarket, as well as other formal and informal public spaces. Amongst such critics there is disagreement about whether to press for the extension of 'citizenship' into caring relationships in the house, for example, or whether this might militate against a strong feminist conception of citizenship that must be based on active public participation (see Deitz 1987; Lister 2002). Double-edged though it may be, these moves helped conceptions of citizenship to embrace many women, whose traditional roles often rendered them less visible in terms of gendered dominant conceptions of citizenship (Pateman 1987). This involves a double agenda – first, granting full legal status and access to citizenship rights to women, second to address issues of substantive gender inequalities by recognising the domestic and private spheres as sites of citizenship practices (as additional places where citizens are to be 'found').

Without ironing out artificially internal differences, 'difference democrats' lead us to the view that democracy can find its citizens deep in civil society and the domestic sphere, as well as in the public sphere of the world of the public economy and politics. Advocates of associative democracy (Hirst 1994) offer a more functional version of this view. Associative democrats would find (active, empowered) citizens interacting in and through groups at local community level. There is less emphasis here on issues of appropriate forms of deliberative discussion, or of gender inequalities, and more emphasis on citizens making genuine choices through local associations.

Deliberative and difference critiques press democrats to see citizens as formal members of the nation-state – to be sure – but to go beyond that level to find them in a range of forums, outside the conventional public sphere, outside traditional 'male spaces', partly by a radical, pluralizing rethinking of those very spaces and what they can be for citizens. In part this critique shows the elasticity of 'citizenship' as a concept – there can be dry and formal and more intensive and less formal sites and spaces where democratic citizens might be found.

The more radical deliberative, 'difference' and associative theorists force us to rethink where citizens and citizen actins are to be found. But there remain major boundaries which, by and large, they do not cross – those of nation-sate and species, respectively. Let's consider these in turn briefly, as further extensions of the idea of where democracy might find its citizens.

Democratic theory, like other realms of political theory, has had basic assumptions challenged by variants of the globalisation thesis over the past 20 years or so. There are sceptics and optimists of varied stripes in these debates. But many cosmopolitans are keen to extend citizenship, in some sense, to supra-national levels – regional or global or both. If international manufacturing processes and CO2 emissions, the

deeply imbalanced terms of global trade, and the scourges of war and terrorism cannot be contained within or dealt with by single states acting alone, then we need democratic structures at these supra-statal levels. If democracy goes global – which it could be in various ways, starting from the transpositions of the nation-state model (Held (1995), and working through to more unconventional and less statist views (Dryzek 2000) – then surely democratic citizens cannot be rightly regarded as being found just within territorial states. From this perspective, people in other countries can be seen as my fellow citizens; formally, though we live in different countries, new overarching political structures could make us common, citizenly, members; informally, though geographically we are 'found' in the same places we are in now, our regard or citizenly concern and obligation for teach other. That statement rolls together radically different propositions of course – from the state-model-transposition of David Held (1995) to the proposition that democratisation requires radical discursive and cross-border action outside all state structures, a view prominently associated with John Dryzek (2000). But at one level such visions unite around the idea that theorists, on the one hand, and we all as citizens on the other, can and should find citizens with whom we share communities of fate which transcend simple territorial borders. Why are not those in distant places who die from weapons that our taxes buy *our* obligation, our citizenly brothers and sisters? In a soft sense, I might have citizenly regard for non-compatriots with whom I share (say) an ecological community-of-fate.

Such communities of fate may be complex and shifting; economics and politics are now about our locations within flows rather than places, networks rather than line hierarchies; shifting power rather than located power. More to the point, and more radically, it may be that formally and legally we should be fellow citizens of larger federations with the political scope and reach to act upon real trends and issues that have emasculated nation-states.

If democratic citizens might be found outside territorial borders, in the different sense canvassed, can they – even more unthinkable, this? – be found outside the boundaries of humanity itself? Can the fox family that lives part-time in my inner suburban London garden consist, in some sense, of my fellow citizens? Are they worthy objects of my regard (and how do they regard me?), do I share a community of fate with them, can the places and spaces they move in and claim be spaces and places of citizen action and regard in some transformed sense? The issues here are ones of boundaries of competence and communicative capacity for citizenship – issues which are best dealt with under the other questions, considered below. But in terms of where citizens are seen or found, animals are territorial inhabitants; it is just that their territoriality works very differently from that of humans (shaped by human action though it is), especially in contemporary, highly technological and urbanised societies where our reliance on immediate natural surroundings is weak. Can democratic citizens be found in so many more spaces and places – living in forests, in holes in the ground, in the air, in the sea?

Where does or can democracy find its citizens? The answer is increasingly differentiated, contested. But current democratic thinking is challenging and extending the location and type of domain concerned. Traditionally and more formally, liberal democracies (and other systems) find and see citizens within nation-state borders, and within that more often in public than in private, more in the voting

booth than the forum. Innovative democratic challengers find them in additional places. Deliberative and difference democrats find citizens in forums, some in varied spaces of civil society and in the traditional private sphere as well as the state; cosmopolitans and political ecologists may in time tempt us to find them outside the borders and across the human-non-human boundary.

How does democracy construct or construe its citizens?

Political actors, not least 'citizens', do not come to the arena with pre-given and complete identities. Nor do they leave it with newly minted and essential identities. Part and parcel of where theorists and others find or see citizens, is what they think those citizens are – what they are capable of, what is beyond them, how they see themselves, and so on. In this domain, post-structuralist approaches to citizenship, such as that of Mouffe, have been influential in recent years. Such approaches suggest that citizen identities, like all identities, are always contingent and subject to change, or from another angle to re-construction. As Mouffe writes, 'the social agent [is] constituted by an ensemble of "subject positions" that can never be totally fixed in a closed system of differences, constructed by a diversity of discourses among which there is no necessary relation, but rather a constant movement of overdetermination and displacement' (1993: 77).

But this poststructuralist view is itself one perspective on the construction of citizen identities. It contends with a range of others, from more conventional and more innovative democratic thinking. Liberal democracy, it is often contended, sees its citizens as rights-bearing rational actors making choices which serve their interests. Although it works through in varied policy and ideological positions, the liberal tenor is one of scepticism about government, unless government action can plausibly be defended as enabling individual freedom. The tension built into liberal political theory is the simultaneous necessity for the state's protection and suspicion of its motives, and its capacity and even inclination to undermine the very rights it exists to protect.

So deeply entrenched is the idea of self-seeking individualism and rights as the core depiction of the modern citizen that innovative new democratic models and approaches offer partial constructions of citizens and their potentialities which build on rather than provide alternatives to liberal democratic orthodoxy. Many do, however, shift the emphasis with respect to potentialities by shifting from citizens as the recipients of government decisions that are made in their name, to citizens as the direct makers of decisions – or at least direct participants in the process of their making. As a part of so doing, such writers frame questions about citizen competences and capacities in ways which, for example, stress moral agency of engaged citizenship rather than technical measures of citizen knowledge (see for instance Smiley 1999). Deliberative, direct and associative democrats variously look to the design of democratic mechanisms through which under-used and under-appreciated decision-making capacities of citizens might be channelled and exploited. So we have referendums and citizens initiatives and recalls and so on with respect to direct democracy; deliberative forums, sometimes for citizen participants and at other times for citizens as enlightened audiences; and radical budgetary decentralisation and participative serve-delivery through diverse associations for associative democrats

(Budge 1996; Smith 2000; Fishkin and Luskin 2000; Hirst 1991). Lying just behind such mechanisms and assumptions is a view of a particular citizen capability to reach beyond one's own narrower interests to recognise and even to encapsulate the interests of a variety of other individuals and groups, including perhaps noncompatriot and even non-species ones. To capture some of these reconstructions and reconstruals of citizen identities in a blunt manner: deliberative and other democrats see citizens as talkers and reasoners as well as calculators and choosers. Cosmopolitans, in addition to seeing empathetic capacities extended to non-national others, catch a sense of enhanced reasoning capacities, as do even more radically in some ways ecological democrats. The citizen here is construed as more than capable of achieving an 'enlarged mentality' which enables consideration and empathy with (perhaps radically different) others.

To construe the essence of citizen capacity or character in individualistic and independent, or communal and situated, or moral and empathetic, is to take factual and normative cases about characteristics and to mould, theoretically, an image of what the citizen really is or can be in terms of identity. 'Difference' democrats, in a style that works with the grain of the poststructuralist view mentioned above, seek to resist the easy or hasty assertion of common points of identity among compatriots (or other significant groups). Such efforts at 'objectivity' run up against the inevitable particularity of our judgements of self and others, and the specificity of issues and problems that polities and citizens need to deal with (Young 2000, 113). Situated, differentiated, perspectives are what is brought to public deliberation; 'speaking across difference' rather than to put difference aside or eliminate it, is a primary goal. Citizens may be members of states but they are culturally embedded in more particular ways. They may share outlooks and assumptions but they may also be deluded into over-emphasising commonalities when class, gender, religious and other perspectives differ so much and have such implications for empowerment and disempowerment. From this point of view, liberal citizenship – along with deliberative or cosmopolitan or other variants which argue for the essential and common character of specified citizen identities, competences or desires - is in tension with the notion of an irreducible plurality of other identities and identifications, chosen or otherwise. From poststructuralist and 'difference' points of view; a more mature and realistic conception of citizenship would be one which allows for, and indeed embraces, the contingencies and multiplicities of identity and identification in complex contemporary societies.

What does democracy expect and demand of its citizens?

Where advocates of different views of democracy find or see citizens and citizen actions depends upon how those citizens are construed. How they are construed, likewise, has a major impact on what can be expected of democratic citizens. The main framework for discussions of expectations and demands is normally that of 'rights and obligations', and specifically the obligations in terms of citizens respecting the rights of others, and acting with a certain level of independence and public spiritedness (Smiley 1999).

The liberal-representative model of democracy primarily sees citizens' obligations in terms of obeying the law and playing a political role by voting in elections. Beyond that, generally speaking, the liberal citizen can just get on with it – pursuing their

interests and their leisure. There is no great demand that citizens participate in politics or in democratic public life beyond this – although liberal theorists and liberal polities are well known for periods of moralising, and 'moral panic', in which more specific moral obligations are pushed as being core to citizenly outlook and action.

A number of critics have contrasted a version of a republican model of citizenship which runs directly counter to liberal views with respect to the obligation to public orientation and regard. Republicanism is seen as a model or theory which requires or expects greater concern and involvement in public life for all citizens, seeing the pursuit of collective freedom, self-government and the development of individual capacity and participation as more valuable than individual freedoms and interests (Barber 1984). Many deliberative conceptions of democracy have republican roots, which are reflected in deliberative emphases upon public talk, public-regarding talk and reason-giving and the seeking of collective solutions to problems which reach beyond the calculus of narrow interest or potential individual or sub-group gain.

Some of these deliberative threads find echoes in the context of other democratic innovations. Democracy, it seems, in the eyes of many contemporary theorists, does not make sufficient demands on its citizens; or does not have a sufficiently expansive or challenging conception of citizenship which might stretch as well as capture the imaginations of most citizens at least some of the time. Cosmopolitans, for example, would expand our roles as citizens in a couple of related ways. First, in a more formal and technical sense, they would expand the range of polities within which we exercise familiar democratic roles, especially voting, from the local and national to the regional and global. And secondly – more complexly and more interestingly perhaps – cosmopolitans would have us stretch our imaginations not only to be public- and other-regarding with respect to our compatriots, but also with respect to people in other countries and regions. The first approach would have us paying greater heed to the situations and needs of others by virtue of the fact that we literally become fellow citizens in some sense; the second would do it by asking us to extend citizenly regard and sympathies despite the fact (almost *because* of the fact) that the others in question are not in formal terms fellow citizens. Ecological democrats, too, seek a stretching of our imaginations in ways that add demands and obligations to citizen roles. Having regard for more than one's own interests is fine; having less self-serving regard for fellow human citizens even better. But being prepared to live within the natural rhythms and confines of place, in other words to live sustainability and to learn to love it constitutes a broader set of expanded citizen obligations.

Direct democrats (Budge 1996) offer a radical extension of (nevertheless) familiar liberal-representative democracy expectations of citizens. Direct democrats of his ilk would have us voting on issues and not just candidates, and voting more often and more systematically – a bit like a cross between today's Swiss and Californians. Direct democrats need, on one level, simply to note that most people in western democracies (and a range of others too) are much more educated than a few decades ago, have much more access to politically relevant information, and so on. In other words, citizens can hardly help but be better informed today than (say) thirty or forty years ago. To up the ante a touch in terms of expectations for how many times voting choices will or ought to be exercised does not seem to make an extra demands of kind, just of time and number.

To engage, to be more other-regarding and public-oriented; these are threads which are common to reformist and more radical extensions of citizen expectations and obligations. There are other perspectives that are provocatively ambiguous in their possible implications for citizen roles. Difference democrats raise the bar of expectations in a range of ways. First, they stress the need for citizens to recognise (and by recognising, affirm in some sense) differences and diversity (or conflicting aspects of identity and perspective) *within* individuals, as well as across social and cultural groups with highly divergent outlooks and perspectives in society as a whole. Agreement on policy or aspects of common identity across difference needs to be the result of dialogue that is open to and embraces the strength of diverse perspectives. Some feminist critics of standard notions of citizenship, in particular, have sought to extend our sense of what 'counts' as citizen activity across (differently conceived and various) public/private divides, and to take seriously what happens for example in the domestic sphere – child-rearing and domestic labour for example – as significant collective contributions made by citizens which should be valued and appreciated as part of an extended appreciation of what being a citizen involves (though as noted above feminist critics also stress the importance of action in the public sphere to advance feminist concerns).

Before completing this section, I want to dwell briefly on the public/private distinction and opposition, as it cuts importantly across each of the framing questions I have employed here. A number of innovative challenges to conventional democratic conceptions of citizenship question the positing or the location or indeed the valuing of a public/private divide. It is as well to be clear that the public/private distinction has two separate dimensions , which deal with places and acts respectively:

		ACTS	
		Public	Private
PLACES	Public	A	B
	Private	C	D

Some theorists – and framing questions – stress the places for enacting citizenship. Others stress the acts themselves which constitute citizenly acts. Others again, notably perhaps poststructuralist writers, stress that citizenship is about the very disruption and incompleteness of such a way of representing the categories of citizenship.

What are the places of citizenship – where citizens are found? What are citizenly acts? We tend to think of citizenship in both cases as being more about the public side of the equation. But ecologists push citizenship more into the private sphere in the form of the home, for example, with such issues as recycling of domestic waste – a public act with public consequences but performed in a private place (C)? Child-rearing in the home might be public-in-private in this sense too. Sexual activity is presumably private in private, but perhaps there is a public dimension even there – or, certain discourses of citizenship might push debates in that direction. And bringing supposedly private acts into the public domain can be a way of highlighting hidden or overlooked inequalities that bear on public regard[4].

[4] On these and related issues of public and private, see Steinberger (1999).

The key point here is that not only do democratic innovations expand the domains of citizenship – in theory and sometimes in practice – they change they way we think about some of those 'domains', too. No simple public/private distinctions can be used to map changes in citizenship. The picture is more changeable and complex than that.

What does democracy expect of its citizens? Enlarged mentality, greater participation, more other-regarding actions – these are some of the key recent responses from theorists. Of course, on this question there have always been minimalists and maximalists, idealists and 'realists' among democratic theorists. Maximalist/idealists will always want better, more selfless, more publicly-oriented citizens. To that extent we are on familiar territory. But the sheer range and style of some of the challenges and pressures are distinctive, as we have seen.

Democratic spaces and citizen identities: rethinking political representation

There is a spectre at the feast in much of the discussion so far. It is possible that innovative democratic theories push back boundaries because that's where theoretical logic and a sense of progressive politics leads them. Equally, they may be following in the wake of something else which as absorbed much theoretical attention in recent years – the march of 'governance' into new domains, increasingly areas of life falling under state or state-like regulation, the expanded domains of security and surveillance and the 'need' (or at least the administrative appetite) for knowledge about myriad citizen practices. Democracy and representation may be largely still understood as formal and hierarchical; but it seems that politics is increasingly broad, informal, network-based, and invasive. Perhaps, for example, it is increasing governance of nature and non-human animals that leads where ecological democratic theorists experience the need to follow.

In the context of more complex, expansive and differentiated practices of governance, basic concepts implicated in debates about democracy and citizenship need to be rethought. One concept in urgent need of such rethinking is that of representation. Partly this is because we need to reconnect the idea of democratic representation with the practices of constituting citizen identities, as discussed above. But further, it is clear that much political representation in today's complex polities is non-electoral; if we are to assess the democratic credentials of non-electoral representation we shall need some radical rethinking. I want to indicate the direction I see such rethinking necessarily taking.

Jane Mansbridge's recent advocacy of a shift in perspective from 'singular, aggregatively-oriented, and district-based' criteria for representation, to what she calls 'plural, deliberatively-oriented, and systemic criteria' (2003) is highly welcome. It is restricted only in that she develops it in the context of electoral representation only, and that she does not sufficiently problematise the construction of citizen identities through processes of political representation.

On the latter point, about the construction of citizen identities *through* political representation, it is vital that we shift our perspective on representation to encompass the more aesthetic aspects of the concept. In other words, political representatives

construct portrayals or depictions of the represented, in order to be able to represent them. This is an unavoidable part of what it means to represent. Citizen identities, on this view, are contested and contestable objects of claims that are made by would-be representatives, elected or otherwise. Identities and expectations and locations rest upon the making of representations.

Politicians often claim to be able to read off constituency and national interests, to have a unique hotline to voters' real wants and needs. But the fact is that they can only do so after first deploying an interpretative frame containing selective representations of their constituents. To speak for others – as elected representatives do, of course – is to make representations which render those others visible and readable. Linda Alcoff puts the point well: 'In both the practice of speaking for as well as the practice of speaking about others, I am engaging in the act of representing the other's needs, goals, situation, and in fact, who they are. I am representing them as such and such … I am participating in the construction of their subject-positions. This act of representation cannot be understood as founded on an act of discovery wherein I discover their true selves and then simply relate my discovery' (Alcoff 1991, 9).

Let's return now to the issue of the democratic status of nonelectoral representation. But if many representatives – or those making claims to be representative – are not elected, how is democratic theory to understand them – and come up with appropriate criteria of democratic legitimacy? Consider some of the types of new representative claim. First, A representative claim may be based on the idea that larger human interests and needs that are vital and need to be represented or voiced, but are too wide to receive sufficient voice in a national political system need to be given such voice. One might consider for example the rock stars Bob Geldof and Bono and their advocacy of third world debt relief, famine relief and poverty alleviation. Second, a representative claim may be based on the fact that an important perspective within a debate is not being heard or even voiced. For example a representative claim might be based on the idea that one is a surrogate spokesperson for a group that because of its geographical dispersion has no elected representative. Third, a claim may be based on massive and tangible demonstration of popular support in the context of freedom of expression. Fourth, a claim that may be based on mirroring, or descriptive similarity between the claimant and the audience or constituency he or she claims to speak or stand for. For example, a deliberative poll (Fishkin and Luskin) or a citizens' jury might actually be incorporated into the policy-making process and gain legitimacy from the random basis of its selection. In many cases these groups are claimed to maximise social or descriptive representation. Fifth, a representative claim might be based on the notion that one stands for or speaks for a group that has a material or other 'stake' in a process or a decision, and therefore has a right to have its interests included in the process. Procedures which incorporate 'stakeholders' in deliberative and decisional forums can be quite formal, as was the case for example at the Johannesburg World Summit on Environment and Development in 2002. Potential stakeholders might be new or potential constituencies. A radical vision of such a new constituency might be non-human animals and their interests, for example. Claims to represent or speak for human communities-of-fate which cross national boundaries may be another example (see Dobson 1996; Eckersley 2000).

How might democratic theorists evaluate such claims – not wanting to rule them out of court simply because of their non-elective basis? In practice there will be multiple and overlapping criteria, which much room for deliberation over their democratic credentials. To pick on possibilities which are most unusual and newest – thus connecting more to the democratic innovations discussed above - the criteria might include:

A. A claim being democratically acceptable because the claimant's activities are locked in to networks of informal accountability. A representative claim might be based on the actor being 'locked into' a tight or dense network of organisational or other like ties, such that alternative forms of accountability become exercised. One might for example think in terms of the thickness of the 'cobweb of connections in the ecology of communities' (March and Olsen 1995: 177). There are various mechanisms for achieving accountability of organisation which do not require election. Dense networks lend legitimacy arguable in part because they constrain actors in ways that are analogous to electoral constraints.

B. Is a representative claim acceptable on the face of it precisely because it is untainted by formal election processes? If Carl Schmitt was right that parliamentary democracy involved the embodiment of a certain 'principled unprincipledness' (Ankersmit), then perhaps there is always a 'space' for such claims? Electoral pressures, it is sometimes argued, press those subject to them to look to short-term and parochial interests. They also force one to address – rhetorically at least – a wide array of concerns.

C. Going one step further, is a claim acceptable precisely because it is untainted by formal membership of a state apparatus? A distinctive version of this criterion is Dryzek's 'contest of discourses' approach. In my words rather than his, we could say that electoral processes are linked to the state, and that the state is tied into structural imperatives that prevent it from acting systematically in the interests of its citizens. Dryzek argues that ' … we can step back and ask whether democracy does indeed require counting heads. I would argue that a logically complete alternative exists based on a conceptualisation of intersubjective communication in the public sphere as a matter of the contestation of discourses' (Dryzek 2000, 84). I do not want to go that far. But perhaps dominant representations of discourses in such a 'contest of discourses' could form the basis of non-elective representative claims?

D. Is a claim justified precisely because it taps into non-electoral modes of political participation, such as (a) deliberation, (b) through voluntary associations, or (c) dissenting activism? Deliberative forums, whether of randomly chosen or part-selected or within or between voluntary associations, can give rise to compelling claims to represent considered popular opinion. Similarly, people can 'do it for themselves' (Bang and Dyrberg 2000), pursuing 'individualised collective action' in new and innovative ways (Micheletti 2003). Dissenting activism can be conceived in terms of major social movements that seek to force a system to live up to its own ideals. A key argument here is that democracy is not just about deliberation within

established forums. Those forums can become sclerotic and moribund if they are not subject to pressure and renewal through outsider activism and dissent.

In short, just as the scope and reach of governance processes now seep into new spaces and actions beyond conventionally 'political' ones, so it expands the domains in which political representation, in varied forms, operates within. But such expansion brings with it the need to rethink the basic concept of representation in political theory – in its identity-producing effects, on the one hand, and in the criteria we might apply to increasingly prominent claims to be representative put forward by unelected actors.

Enacting democracy

We have seen a real plurality of expanded domains of democracy and citizenship. Both notions are being pulled in new directions, and are taking other key concepts, like representation, with them. My blunt final question, in the light of this fact, is: can we any more offer a 'theory of democracy' in the face of such plurality, differentiation and complexity?

My tentative answer is yes, so long as our strategy exploits that very plurality and complexity. The way forward for democratic theory, I suggest, is to think in terms of the creative construction of democratic procedures, depending on the principles and purposes of the sponsor. These theoretical constructions can then be used – as democratic theory has always been used – to provoke thinking about real world decision-making procedures.

To a significant extent, the core concerns of most of the innovative ideas of democracy discussed crystallize in the particular political devices that they advocate – for example, for cosmopolitans, new supranational confederal arrangements; for deliberative democrats, for example, specific deliberative forums such as deliberative polls; political ecologists advocate (e.g.) proxy representation and special environmental defence institutions; and direct democrats advocate the use of the initiative and referendum devices. In such cases, these devices are allied to other, more familiar ones, like elected legislatures and constitutions conferring civil and political rights. Further, both singly and together, devices *enact principles*: variously autonomy, political equality, inclusion, the common interest, participation. In this sense, we can say that principles are primarily things that we *do* through the operation of political devices, rather than rights or statuses that are conferred. A deliberative poll, for example, enacts one sense of the principle of political equality; a policy referendum presents a quite different sense of the same principle. Including both of these devices in a real decision procedure different dimensions of political equality and inclusion for example.

Viewing a democratic procedure as a *sequence* of devices, deployed so as to *evoke* certain principles and to provoke certain motivations in different groups and individuals, enables us to make connections across the innovations and the dimensions (Saward 2003). Bringing together procedural devices in new combinations enables us (in principle) to pool insights and hopes from deliberative, cosmopolitan, ecological and other advances.

Adopting this approach to democratic theory encourages and enables us to conceive of sequences of discrete devices in an enriched, complex and flexible idea of democratic procedure. Why not citizens' initiatives to set the agenda, subsequent deliberative poll and parliamentary deliberation, followed by parliamentary decision to be endorsed by popular referendum, as a vision of a single democratic procedure?

Such is the rich variety of democratic innovations today that we need a rather abstract, minimalist and proceduralist framework within which we can begin to see how apparently quite different innovations can be productively linked. Theories of 'prefix democracy' (deliberative', 'associative', 'direct', 'ecological') can be too partisan and partial. By renewing and expanding the idea of a democratic procedure, we can weigh the rich array of new, alternative conceptions of democratic decision-making without in principle reducing democracy itself to any one of its specific institutional possibilities.

Conclusion

It is clear that the idea of democratic citizenship is being pushed into new, expanded domains. These domains are ones of kind (e.g. crossings of the human/non-human boundary), breadth (e.g. encompassing private spaces and actions as well as classically public ones), and depth (e.g. seeing citizens as more complex characters with more differentiated identities and potentialities). Dominant and new perspectives on democracy give us different ideas as to where citizens are to be found, what to expect of them, and how they ought to be understood. These perspectives press us, in turn, to rethink the scope and meaning of basic concepts, such as representation, and indeed to rethink basic questions about what it means to construct democratic theory.

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